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The aim of this presentation is to define Sartre’s contribution regarding the issue of 
autobiography, but also to explain why his phenomenological approach stands out from the 
analyses made by Heidegger on this question. Indeed, Sartre’s writings show that his 
phenomenology of autobiography is inspired by Being and Time, where – on the basis of the 
concept of Selbstheit, which could be translated by “selfhood” – Heidegger develops an 
existential definition of the concept of “personal identity”. Owing to this influence, many 
thinkers esteem that the phenomenology of autobiography formulated in Being and 
Nothingness on the basis of the concept of “circuit of selfness” (circuit de l’ipséité), is nothing 
else than a retread of Being and Time’s conception of Selbstheit. According to them, Sartre 
develops just like Heidegger an “internalist” conception of autobiography because he thinks 
that the origin of individuation is an intentional movement thanks to which the individual 
turns away from an unauthentic and alienating world, in order to focus on himself. 
This interpretation – which is problematical, in my opinion, because it gives the impression 
that Sartre is a subjectivist and antisocial thinker – was made by Bourdieu (1980), but also by 
many Sartrean commentators (Flajoliet, 2005) who, given that they read Being and 
Nothingness starting from Being and Time, do not see the originality of Sartre’s 
phenomenology of autobiography. 
For my part, I will adopt the opposite stance by supporting the hypothesis that Sartre and 
Heidegger formulate different analyses of personal identity and autobiography (two concepts 
that will be synonymous in my presentation, because these two thinkers don’t really draw a 
distinction between these notions). In order to support this assumption, I will present 
Heidegger’s conception of selfhood and its reception by Sartre in the context of the Second 
World War. Then, I will study the objections raised by the latter against Heidegger, and how 
they led him to invent a phenomenological method named “existential psychoanalysis” whose 
function is to decipher everyone’s autobiography. And the two parts of this presentation will 
be based on the following sources: paragraphs 10 and 64 of Being and Time, books III and XI 
of Sartre’s War Diary, and Being and Nothingness’ fourth part. 
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